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ANTITERRORISM MILITARY COMMISSIONS:

COURTING ILLEGALITY
JordanJ.Paust*
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a sweeping and
highly controversial Military Order for the purpose of creating military
commissions with exclusive jurisdiction to try certain designated foreign
nationals "for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws"
relevant to any prior or future "acts of international terrorism." The Order reaches far beyond the congressional authorization given the
President "to use all necessary and appropriate force," including "use of

the United States Armed Forces," against those involved in the September 1 1th attack "in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
,,2
persons. The Order contains no time limit, it is potentially applicable
to any acts of international terrorism that have "adverse effects on the
U.S., its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy," and
prosecutions under it can involve war crimes or violations of "other ap-

plicable laws." 3 In the Order, the President also declared that "it is not
practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
*

Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston. A.B. (1965), J.D. (1968), UCLA;

LL.M. (1972), Univ. of Virginia; J.S.D. Cand., Yale Univ.; Faculty, U.S. Army TJAG School
(1969-1973).
I. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001,66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 §§ I(e), 2(a)(l)(ii)-(iii) (Nov.
16, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
2. Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
3. See Military Order, supra note 1,§§ l(e), 2(a)(l)(ii). Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales apparently did not understand the Order. He claimed that it "covers only
foreign enemy war criminals... and they must be chargeable with offenses against the international laws of war." Alberto R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair,N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 2001, at A27. See also George Lardner, Legal Scholars Criticize Wording of Bush Order,
WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2001, at AI0; sources cited infra note 52 and accompanying text (regarding other claims of Mr. Gonzales); Committee on Military Affairs and Justice of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Inter Arma Silent Leges: In Times of Armed
Conflict, Should the Laws be Silent? at 25-26 & n.68, 28 (Dec. 2001), http://
www.abcny.org/pdf/Should%20the%2OLaws%20be%2OSilent%204.pdf (last visited Feb. 18,
2002) [hereinafter N.Y. City Bar Report]. The ill-conceived order was apparently prepared by
only a few new White House and Department of Justice lawyers who failed to seek input
from those at the Departments of State or Defense or other JAG lawyers familiar with international law. See, e.g., Josh Tyrangiel, The Legal War: and Justice For ...,TIME, Nov. 26,
2001, at 66 (naming deputy assistant attorney general John Yoo and deputy White House
counsel Tim Flanigan as individuals that "felt that offshore military tribunals would be upheld without much problem"); Toni Locy & Richard Willing, Proposal Would Widen
Defendants' Rights, USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 2001, at 9A (noting that in the face of widespread
criticism DOD lawyers have attempted to form rules of procedure that meet some of the
international law concerns despite inconsistent language in the order).
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criminal cases in the United States district courts."4 This statement defies logic since its validity must be tested contextually,5 yet it was made
before the creation of any military commission for trial of any particular
persons and before any particular rules of evidence had been devised by
the Secretary of Defense. In addition, it purports to apply to every future
military commission created under the Order regardless of its location
or time of creation or other relevant circumstances."
In its present form and without appropriate congressional intervention, the Military Order will create military commissions that involve
unavoidable violations of international law and raise serious constitutional challenges. Both problems might undermine overall prosecutorial
efforts. Further, exclusive jurisdiction in military commissions is needlessly limiting of U.S. options in the long-term fight against
international terrorism. New ad hoc rules of procedure, changeable by
the Secretary of Defense, might solve some of the problems created by
the Military Order, but issues concerning the validity of certain rules of
procedure exist since they are inconsistent with requirements under the

Order. Some of the problems have not been solved, and today's rules
might be changed.
When I was a Captain on the faculty of the U.S. Army JAG School
during the Vietnam War, we took a different approach when we drafted a
military commission to try ex-service persons for alleged war crimes.
The Department of Defense also prepared a study on such a commission
in 1970.7 Government officials and/or President Nixon rejected these
ideas, however, stating that it was politically "too hot" to prosecute, thus
4. Military Order, supra note I, § I(f).
5. The statement apparently involved an attempt to comply with the congressional
mandate in 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) that military commissions follow, to the extent practicable,
"the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal
cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent
with this chapter." 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000). Since the President is bound by the U.S. Constitution to faithfully execute the law (U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 3) and Congress has created a
legislative mandate concerning rules of evidence to be applied in military commissions, the
judiciary should not accept a sweeping and illogical statement concerning what is allegedly
not practicable for every military commission now and in the future. See generally Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 400-01 (1932) ("What are the allowable limits of military discretion,
and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.");
JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAi LAW AS LAW OF THE UNIrTE) STATEs 469-78 (1996)
[HEREINAFI'ER INT'L LAW AS LAW OFT HE U.S.]; N.Y. City Bar Report, supra note 3, at 9-10
& n.31 (noting 10 U.S.C. § 821 sets limits regarding jurisdiction), 19 (stating exclusive jurisdiction conflicts with the congressional mandate of concurrent jurisdiction in 10 U.S.C.
§§ 818, 821).
6. Military Order, supra note I, § I(e).
7. Military Commissions, Dep't of Defense, Office of the General Counsel and Dep't
of the Army, OTJAG, MJ 1970 (copy on file with the author) Ihereinafter 1970 DOD Study].
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setting up a continual violation of the obligations of the United States
under international law to bring those reasonably accused into custody
and then to initiate prosecution or to extradite them to another country.
The military commission, as envisioned in the JAG school proposal
and DOD study, would have generally followed the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and it was hoped to have former federal judges as
judges in order to assure that convictions were less likely to be challenged in view of the expansion of due process guarantees since World
War II. The 1970 DOD study noted that jury trials would not be required, but "specific protections of the Bill of Rights, unless made
inapplicable to military trials by the Constitution itself, have been held
applicable to courts-martial," and "[b]oth logic and precedent indicate
that a lesser standard for military commissions would not be constitutionally permissible." 9 Further, "Congress directed the President to
establish procedures for courts-martial or other military tribunals which
follow, to the extent practicable, the principles of law and rules of evidence generally followed in United States district courts."' Thus, the
8. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crime Jurisdiction Over
Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEx. L. REV. 1,6 & n.l (1971); Michael Getler, Viet
Trials of Ex-Gls: 'Too Hot,' WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1971, at Al. See also William McGaffin,
U.S. May To' 22 Ex-Gls for My Lai, N.Y. POST, Mar. 11, 1970, at 4 (stating Pentagon and
Justice Dep't lawyers had reached a decision to create a military commission, but would
await the decision in the trial of Lt. William L. Calley, Jr.). During the same time, Nixon had
engaged in highly questionable intervention in the Calley case after Calley's conviction and
sentencing. See, e.g., William George Eckhardt, My Lai: An American Tragedy, 68 UMKC L.
REV. 671, 682-83 & n.48 (2000); Spencer Rich, Calley Prosecutor Hits Nixon's Move,
WASH. POST, April 7, 1971, at Al.
9. 1970 DOD Study, supra note 7, tab G, at I.
10. Id. tab G, at 2 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 836). See also sources cited infra notes 32, 48, 51.
Under Article 11, § 3 of the U.S. Constitution, the President is bound to faithfully execute
such law as well as relevant international law. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 3. With respect to the
President's constitutionally-based duty to comply with international law, see, for example,
INT'L LAW AS LAW OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 143-66, and the numerous cases cited
therein; Jordan J. Paust, Paquete and the President: Rediscovering the Brief for the United
States, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 981 (1994).
Additionally, federal statutes, such as 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, concerning jurisdiction of military commissions, and 836, concerning procedures to be followed, must be construed
consistently with international law. 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 836. They "can never be construed to
violate ... rights . . . further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this
country." Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See also,
INT'L LAW AS LAW OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 107 n.9, passim; JORDAN J. PAUsr ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 141-42 (2000) [hereinafter INT'L LAW
AND LITIGATION]; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pmbl.
2(b)(2) (2000)
("Subject to any applicable rule of international law or to any regulations prescribed by the
President or by other competent authority, military commissions ... shall be guided by the
appropriate principles of law and rules of procedure and evidence prescribed for courtsmartial."). Thus, §§ 821 and 836 must be interpreted consistently with the confluence of
human rights, denial of justice, law of war, and other international law requirements noted in
this essay.
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DOD study recommended that "procedures adopted should provide
every safeguard which an accused would be entitled to in a court-martial
or a Federal district court."'
Previously, in 1951, the United Nations Command in Korea had set
up other military commissions on paper. They were never activated but
would have guaranteed the same procedural rights to due process that
existed in general courts-martial in the U.S. military and that are required under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War.' 2 These rights included the right to counsel, to a "reasonable opportunity to consult with his Counsel before and during trial,"
to at least three weeks notice of charges before trial and at least two
weeks to prepare a defense, to interpretation of charges and "the substance of the proceedings" as well as any documentary evidence, to
remain silent, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, to a presumption of
innocence "until his guilt is established by legal and competent evidence
11. 1970 DOD Study, supra note 7, tab G, at 3. Previously, U.S. military commissions
had generally followed the rules of procedure and evidence that applied in general courtsmartial. See, e.g., WLLtAM WtNTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 841 (2 ed. 1920).
Today, it would seem to be "inconsistent with this chapter" within the meaning of 10 U.S.C.
§ 836 to do less. 10 U.S.C. § 836.
12. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.TS. 135 1hereinafter GPW[. Important due process guarantees under
the Convention include those in Articles 3(l)(d), 84-85, 99, 102, 104-106, 129-130. Additional protections lor persons who do not benelit from more favorable treatment under the
1949 Geneva Conventions can be found in Article 75 of' Geneva Protocol 1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva
Protocol 11.Most of the protections in Protocol I are now customary international law. See,
e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 817 (2 ed. 2000) [hereinafter
INT'L CRIMINAL LAW]; Custonary, Law and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
for Protection of War Victims: Future Directions in Light of the U.S. Decision Not to Ratify,
81 PRoc., AM. Soc. INr'IL L. 26, 29-31, 37 (1987) (remarks, Michael J. Matheson, Burrus M.
Carnahan). Geneva protections are nonderogable obligatio erga omnes (i.e., obligations owing to and among all humankind) and must be observed and ensured "in all circumstances,"
much like norms jus cogens. See, e.g., GPW, supra art. I; Geneva Protocol I, supra art. 75.
"[W]ilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed
in" the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention is not merely a war crime but also a "grave
breach" of the Convention and Protocol I. GPW, supra art. 130. See also Geneva Protocol I,
supra art. 85(4)(e); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 3 GENEVA CONVENTrION

RELATIv ro THE TREATMENT OF PRISONLRS OF WAR, COMMENTARY 628 (Jean S. Pictet ed.
1960) [hereinafter Ill PicrEr]; DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10: DEPARrMENT OF THE ARMY
FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 91 499, 502(b), 505(c) (1956) [hereinafter FM
27-10]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), art. 8(2)(a)(vi) ("Wilfully
depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial" is
a "grave breach" of the Geneva Conventions.), (b)(xiv) ("Declaring abolished, suspended or
inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party" is a
war crime.). It is apparent that the present Military Order does just that, although a prosecutor would have to prove relevant mens rea.
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beyond a reasonable doubt," to trial in compliance with "the rules of
evidence prescribed in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
1951," and to an appeal."
The President's Commander-in-Chief power to set up military
commissions applies only during actual war within a war zone or relevant occupied territory and apparently ends when peace is finalized. 4
The United States was clearly at war (however undeclared) in Afghanistan after the insurgency between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance
was upgraded to an international armed conflict when the United States
used military force in Afghanistan on October 7. The United States was
also at war in the Gulf region with respect to Iraq (i.e., regarding the
continuing international armed conflict in that region), and both international armed conflicts triggered application of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and other customary laws of war, including various due
process guarantees for criminal accused.'5 While "war" remains in
13. See U.N. Supplemental Rules of Criminal Procedure for Military Commissions of
the United Nations Command, Korea. Under Rule 45, appeals could have been brought before a board of review.
14. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 1I-I 13 (1946) ("We cannot say that there is no
authority to convene a commission after hostilities have ended to try violations of the law of
war committed before their cessation, at least until peace has been officially recognized by
treaty or proclamation of the political branch of the Government."); Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 28 (1942); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 190 (1853); 24 Op. Att'y Gen.
570, 571 (1903); INT'L CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 309-10; WINTHROP, supra note 11,
at 86 (jurisdiction of military commissions "is determined by the existence and continuance
of war"), 831 (jurisdiction is tied to the war powers, "exclusively war-court"), 836 ("A military commission ... can legally assume jurisdiction only of offences committed within the
field of the command of the convening commander," and regarding military occupation,
"cannot take cognizance of an offence committed without such territory .... The place must
be the theatre of war or a place where military government or martial law may be legally
exercised; otherwise a military commission ... will have no jurisdiction .... "), 837 ("An
offence ... must have been committed within the period of the war or of the exercise of
military government .... [J]urisdiction ... cannot be maintained after the date of a peace
); DIGEST
..... OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMY 1068 (1912);

Henry Wager Halleck, Military Tribunals and Their Jurisdiction,5 AM. J. INT'L L. 958, 96566 (191l) (Military commissions "are established by the President, by virtue of his war
power as commander-in-chief, and have jurisdiction of cases arising under the laws of
war.... [They] are war courts and can exist only in time of war." Halleck was a General
during the Civil War and a prominent international legal scholar who participated in the creation of the 1863 Lieber Code on the laws of war.); Major Michael A. Newton, Continuum
Crimes: Military Jurisdiction Over Foreign Nationals Who Commit International Crimes,
153 MIL. L. REV. 1, 15 (1996); N.Y. City Bar Report, supra note I, at 9; sources cited infra
notes 77-78.
15. See generally INT'L CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 807-20. When an international armed conflict exists, certain persons are entitled to prisoner of war status under GPW
Article 4. GPW, supra note 12, art. 4. It should be noted that the requirements of having "a
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance," "carrying arms openly" during an attack,
and generally following the laws of war appear only in Article 4(A)(2) with respect to members of certain "militias and members of other volunteer corps" and do not appear in 4(A)(l)
regarding "Imlembers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of
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militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces" or in 4(A)(3) regarding
"[miembers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an entity not
recognized by the Detaining Power." Id. See also G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS 52 (1958); 1 HOWARD S. LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAIL ARMED CONFLICT
13-14 (1986); RICHARD 1. MILLER, THE LAW OF WAR 29 (1975); George H. Aldrich, New
Life for the Laws of War, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 764, 768-69 (1981) (GPW Article 4(A)(2) criteria apply only to certain "irregular" armed forces and "[members of regular, uniformed
armed forces do not lose their PW [prisoner of war] entitlements no matter what violations of
the law their units may commit, but the guerrilla unit is held to a tougher standard ....). Cf
Ill PICTET, supra note 12, at 49, (1949 Convention did not follow the 1907 Hague Convention or 1929 Convention but listed separate categories of prisoners of war), 52 (noting States
should also assure that members of armed forces are recognizable from civilians); Geneva
Protocol 1, supra note 12, arts. 43-44. "Any combatant ...shall be a prisoner of war ...
except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4" of Article 44; for example, some combatants may
not qualify as prisoners of war if they do not distinguish themselves from the civilian population and if they do not carry their arms openly. Id. Even those who forfeit their prisoner of
war status under the Protocol "shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention [GPW] and by this
Protocol .....
Id. Further, the Protocol "is without prejudice to the right of any person to be
a prisoner of war pursuant to Article 4" of GPW. Id. art. 44. Cf FM 27- 10, supra note 12,
T 73-74 (stating that members of armed forces also lose their prisoner of war status in such
circumstances but are protected by the Geneva Civilian Convention). But see Ruth Wedgwood, The Rules of War Can't Protect AI Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at A17 (also
assuming in error that unlawful combatants lose their right to "claim protection of the law"
and stating that "it would be a mistake to demand for Al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership
the full protections" of the Geneva Conventions). It is a war crime to engage in attacks out of
uniform, but whether prisoner of war status is lost under the 1949 Convention is a separate
issue. Even if prisoner of war status is lost, any criminal accused of terrorist activities has
due process protections under the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I, human rights law, and
other international laws as noted herein. There is no gap in protection and in case of doubt as
to their status, all persons "having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the
hands of the enemy" shall enjoy prisoner of war protections "until such time as their status
has been determined by a competent tribunal." GPW, supra note 12, art. 5. Further, all such
persons are entitled to the due process guarantees contained in GPW concerning trials of
prisoners of war whether or not the person is being prosecuted for a crime that occurred prior
to the creation of prisoner of war status. See id. art. 85; FM 27-10, supra note 12, 1 505(c)
("prisoners of war accused of war crimes benefit from the provisions of GPW, especially
Articles 82-108"); 11 PICTEr, supra note 12, at 413-23, 625, 628. There was a split in In re
Yamashita whether Articles 60 and 63 of the old 1929 Convention applied to precapture
offenses. Compare In re Yamashita 327 U.S. I, 20-24 (1946) with id. at 74-76, 78 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting). Whether or not the majority was in error, the materials cited above make it
clear that the 1949 Conventions were changed and that due process provisions apply to all
judicial proceedings against a prisoner of war. The International Committee of the Red Cross
Commentary expressly notes In re Yamashita and that the 1949 changes provide due process
protections for all prisoners of war with respect to all offenses. See, e.g., Ill PICi"E", supra
note 12, at 413, 415-18, 421-22; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF IHE RED CROSS, 4 GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, COMMENTARY 349, 354 (Jean S. Pictet ed. 1958) [hereinafter IV PiCTET; GPW, supra note 12,

art. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 70, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 332 [hereinafter GC or Geneva Civilian Convention].
Some persons accused of crimes arising from the September 1Ith attack may not have
been prisoners of war prior to October 7th (see text and sources cited infra note 16), but
might be prisoners of war thereafter if they meet the criteria set forth in Article 4 from Octo-
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ber 7th until their capture. Members of the armed forces of the Taliban were clearly members
of the armed forces of a "Party to the conflict" that occurred since October 7th within the
meaning of GPW Article 4(A)(1). GPW, supra note 12, art. 4(A)(1). It is also probable that
they had distinctive recognizable dress and openly carried arms. The word "Party" does not
have the same meaning as, and is not limited to, state, nation, or government. Whether various al Qaeda units in Afghanistan were "militias or volunteer corps forming part of such
armed forces" would have to be considered in context. Id. Concerning the dispute over
whether they should be considered prisoners of war, see Bryan Bender, Red Cross Disputes
US Stance on Detainees, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2002, at A l (stating ICRC considers "both
the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters held by US forces ... to be prisoners of war."); Tamara
Lytle, Taliban, AI-Qaeda Captives Arrive as Rights Groups Fret, ORLANDO SENTINEl, Jan.
12, 2002, at AI; Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Behind-the-Scenes Clash Led Bush
to Reverse Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A12
(stating the President's reversal and application of the Geneva Conventions came after the
State Department and Pentagon jointly opposed the administration's lawyers in DOJ and
White House Counsel Gonzales). Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has stated that all al Qaeda
members arc "unlawful combatants." John Hendren, 'Bad Guys' 1st to Arrive at U.S. Base,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2002, at A1. This statement seems overly broad and of doubtful validity.
It could also threaten the protection of U.S. military under GPW Article 4(A)(I) if they were
captured by opposition forces. Under GPW Article 5, the status of the al Qaeda prisoners
should be tested by a competent court or tribunal. GPW, supra note 12, art. 5. During an
armed conflict, all persons who are not prisoners of war, including so-called unprivileged or
unlawful combatants who may or may not have prisoner of war status, have at least various
nonderogable rights to due process under the Geneva Civilian Convention and Geneva Protocol I. See, e.g., IV PICTET, supra, at 595 ("applying the same system to all accused whatever
their personal status"); FM 27-10, supra note 12, 1 73 ("If a person is determined by a competent tribunal, acting in conformity with Article 5, GPW, not to fall within any of the
categories listed in Article 4, GPW, he is not entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war. He is,
however, a 'protected person' within the meaning of Article 4, GC." (citations omitted)); GC,
supra, arts. 3(l)(d) (stating all captured persons "shall in all circumstances" be tried in "a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples" thus necessarily incorporating all such guarantees by
reference and as nonderogable Geneva protections, including the customary guarantees mirrored in Article 14 of the International Covenant), 5; Geneva Protocol I, supra note 12, art.
75(4), (7). See also III PICTET, supra note 12, at 51 n.l ("the Convention contains a safety
clause for the benefit of persons not covered [as prisoners of war] ... in Article 3"), 76, 423
(prisoners charged with war crimes retain benefits of the Convention). Today, common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions provides customary minimum protections for all persons
captured in any armed conflicts. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at $1218, 255; Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadi6, 35 I.L.M 32, $$ 65-74 (Int'l
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Person Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l Hum. Law
Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction); INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at
692-95, 816. Additionally, all persons have minimum due process guarantees under human
rights law.
The White House stated recently that the Geneva Convention will apply to the Taliban
but not al Qaeda. al Qaeda "cannot be considered a state party to the Geneva Convention. Its
members, therefore, are not covered by the Geneva Convention and are not entitled to POW
status." The White House added: "[t]he war on terrorism is a war not envisaged when the
Geneva Convention was signed in 1949." Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva
Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 8, 2002, at Al. The White House statement demonstrates remarkable ignorance of the nature and reach of treaties and customary
international law. First, any member of al Qaeda who is a national of a state that has ratified
the relevant treaties is protected by them. Nearly every state, including Saudi Arabia, is a
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Afghanistan, the United States can set up a military commission in Afghanistan (as a non-occupying power, with the consent of the new
Afghan regime) to try those reasonably accused of war crimes, 6 as it did
signatory to these treaties. Second, the 1949 Geneva Conventions are part of customary
international law that is universally applicable in times of armed conflict and, as such, protect all human beings according to their terms. Third, common Article 3 provides
nonderogable protections and due process guarantees for every human being who is captured
and, like common Article I, assures their application in all circumstances. Also, international
terrorism and terrorism in war are not new and clearly were contemplated during the drafting
of the treaties. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Terrorism and the International Law of War, 64 MIL.
L. R:v. I (1974); GC, supra, art. 33; IV Pic'rE'r, supra, at 31, 225-26, 594.
16. Whether war crimes were committed by Mr. bin Laden and his followers prior to
October 7th is highly problematic, since he was not then a leader or member of a state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent group (or in a territory where such a group operated) that was
at war with the United States. A different result would pertain if the Taliban had attacked the
United States on September I Ith and thus created a state of war with the United States. If it
is assumed that the Taliban attacked the United States and did not merely harbor or receive
money and other support from bin Laden and his followers, and if bin Laden was complicit
in that attack, then bin Laden can be considered a complicitor in certain war crimes. See, e.g.,
Jordan J. Paust, Addendum: War and Responses to Terrorism (Sept. 2001), available at
www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm#addendum2; Jordan J.Pausi, Addendum: Prosecution of
Mr.bin Laden et al. for Violations of International law and Civil Lawsuits by Various Victims
(Sept. 21, 2001), available at www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm#addendum5; Warren
Richey, Tribunals on Trial, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 14, 2001, at I (quoting
Professor Leila Sadat: not a war or war crimes on Sept. 1 th). Under international law, war
conduct and war crimes can occur at the hands of non-state actors, but they must be participants in a war or insurgency, or have achieved a status of belligerents or insurgents involved
in an armed conflict. Al Qaeda did not meet insurgent criteria of controlling their own defined territory, having their own government, having an organized armed force, having their
own stable population, or purporting to be or to have the characteristics of a state.
Any attempts to expand the concept of war beyond the present minimal levels of belligerency and insurgency would be extremely dangerous because certain forms of non-state
actor violence and targetings that would otherwise remain criminal (even during an insurgency) could become legitimate. See TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM 19-20
(1970); Waldemar A. Soilf, War Crimes and the Nuremberg Principle, in NATIONAL SECURITY
LAw 359-61 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990). Two such targetings could be the September I Ith attack on the Pentagon and the earlier attack on the U.S.S. Cole, which during
war are lawful military targets, and thus their targeting would be considered legitimate belligerent acts (assuming no other violations existed, such as attacking without uniforms or
distinctive insignia). See William Glaberson, Critics' Attack on Tribunals Turns to Law
Among Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2001, at B I.
Section l(a) of the November 13th Military Order states that "[i]nternational terrorists,
including members of al Qaida have carried out attacks on [the U.S.]... on a scale that has
created a state of armed conflict .... Military Order, supra note 1,§ I(a). This, of course, is
legal nonsense. Its acceptance would have unwanted consequences of legitimizing various
attacks on proper military targets like the President and U.S. "military personnel and facilities" mentioned in that very section of the Military Order. Id. The President's new and unique
defense for prior and future non-state terrorists must be rejected.
Some mayjassume that a war necessarily exists whenever the United States has been
subjected to an armed attack by a non-state actor that triggers a right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. This would be incorrect. Self-defense is not limited to armed
attacks by states, nations, or belligerents. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the
Right of Self-Defense, 95 Am.J. INT'iL L. 839, 840 (2001); Jordan J.Paust, Responding Law-
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with respect to the trial of General Yamashita for war crimes during
World War II.
If the United States had been an occupying power in Afghanistan, it
could have created a military commission in the occupied territory to try
individuals for terrorism in violation of international law, genocide,

other crimes against humanity, and aircraft sabotage in addition to war
crimes.' 7 However, outside of the occupied territory, it is apparent that
military commissions can only be constituted in an actual war zone and
can only prosecute war crimes. In any event, pertinent Commander-inChief powers and jurisdictional competence of the antiterrorism military
commissions appear to end when a relevant war (but not merely war
hostilities) formally ends. Given such limitations, it does not seem to be
in the long-term interest of the United States to state that only military
commissions can prosecute persons covered by the Military Order who
are reasonably accused of participating in prior and future acts of
fully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 711, 716,
723, 729 (1986); Robert F. Turner, Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Constitutional Constraints on Presidential Power, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 77, 87, 89 (1999); U.N. S.C.
Res. 1373, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. pmbl. and T 3(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001); the
Caroline Incident (1837), in 2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-14 (1906) (selfdefense against insurgents).
17. Since their authority is tied to war powers, military commissions generally have jurisdiction only over war crimes, which are violations of the laws of war. See sources cited
supra note 14; sources cited infra notes 41, 50, 77-78. 10 U.S.C. §§ 818 and 821 expressly
confer jurisdiction for prosecution of violations of the law of war and are silent with respect
to other crimes. 10 U.S.C. § 818, 821. Section 4(a) of the Military Order states that accused
shall be tried for "offenses triable by military commission." Military Order, supra note 1,
§ 4(a). Thus, one question is whether military commissions can address crimes other than
war crimes. In practice, some have addressed other crimes under international law that occurred during war (such as crimes against humanity during World War 1I) when, but only
when, the military commissions were convened in occupied territory. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 288-93. Occupying powers actually have a greater
competence under the law of war to prosecute various crimes. See, e.g., GC, supra note 15,
arts. 64, 66-68, 71-75, 147; Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631. Since international
law is part of the law of the United States and the President is bound to faithfully execute it
(see text and sources cited supra note 10), the President actually has an enhanced power to
execute laws of war that confer powers on an occupying power to prosecute crimes.
Concerning enhancement of Executive power by international law, see, for example, INT'L
LAW AS LAW OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 6, 34-37 n.39, 72 n.82, 154 n.2, 159 n.36, 441,
464-65 n.62. Thus, when the United States is an occupying power, a military commission
could prosecute crimes other than war crimes because of a special competence conferred by
the law of war. When the United States is not an occupying power, it is apparent that military
commission jurisdiction is limited to prosecution of war crimes. Concerning the issue
whether the United States had been an occupying power of part of Afghanistan, see text and
sources cited infra note 67. A recent A.B.A. resolution recommends that the military commissions prosecute only war crimes. See Jeff Blumenthal, ABA Overwhelmingly Votes to
Favor Curbs on Bush's Militarv Tribunals, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 5, 2002, at 24 [hereinafter A.B.A. res.].
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international terrorism, as opposed to setting up a regional or more
general international criminal court by Executive Agreement or using
Article Ill federal courts." Like Article III courts, a regional or more
general international criminal court with jurisdiction over impermissible
acts of terrorism and related international crimes would be able to
prosecute accused long after peace is reinstated in Afghanistan.
Additionally, the United States has told the world that it is fighting
terrorism for democratic values and freedom. Certain forms of military
commissions could appear to be most inappropriate in view of what the
United States stands for and what it has told the world it is fighting for
and against. Military commissions are generally suspect under newer
international criminal law-human rights treaties' and human rights
law. In a landmark case in 1999, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights denounced the use of military commissions in Peru, ruling that
civilians should have been tried in civilian courts, that accused were
detained too long prior to charges or trial, that the right to be brought
promptly before a judge must be subject to judicial control, that the
right to judicial protection must include the right to habeas corpus
petitions (which cannot be suspended during an emergency), that
defense attorneys lacked access to witnesses and evidence and did not
have adequate time to prepare their cases, that the accused must be able
to cross-examine all witnesses against them, that trials cannot be held in
secret, and that there must exist a right of appeal to an independent and
impartial tribunal. 2 Even earlier, in 1984, the Human Rights Committee
created under the International Covenant declared that trial of civilians
18. Concerning prosecution in federal district courts, including prosecution for war
crimes, see, for example, INT'L CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 253-61; Paust, supra note
8, at 27 (using 10 U.S.C. § 818 (incorporating the law of war) in conjunction with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231); Paust, Addendum: Prosecution of Mr bin Laden et al.
for Violations o1 International
LIaw and Civil Lawsuits by Various Victims, supra note 16; United States v. bin Laden, 92 F.
Supp.2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,27-28 (1942) ("From
the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war ....);
United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1525 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231, federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with military courts over allviolations of the laws of the United States ....); Harold Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courts
for Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at A39. Exclusive jurisdiction in a military commission would violate the mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 3231 that federal district courts shall have
jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United States. See U.S.C. § 3231 (2000).
See also sources cited supra note 5.
19. See, e.g., the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons,
June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1529, 1531, art. IX ("Persons alleged to be responsible ...may be
tried only in the competent jurisdictions of ordinary law in each state, to the exclusion of all
other special jurisdictions, particularly military jurisdictions.").
20. See Castillo Petruzzi, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Ser. C, No. 52 (May 30,
1999), addressed in Jeanine Bucherer, International Decisions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 171
(2001).
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by military or special courts "should be very exceptional"
"genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in article
treaty.2' The 1999 U.S. Department of State Country Report
Rights Practices for Peru noted particular human rights
including:

and must
14" of the
on Human
violations,

Proceedings in these military courts-and those for terrorism in
civilian courts-do not meet internationally accepted standards
of openness, fairness, and due process. Military courts hold
treason trials in secret ....

Defense attorneys in treason trials

are not permitted adequate access to the files containing the
State's evidence against their clients ....

22

The 1999 Country Report on Egypt addressed denials of human
rights to "fair public trial" in the military and State Security Emergency
courts, noting particular infractions:
the military courts do not ensure civilian defendants due process
before an independent tribunal ....

There is no appellate process

for verdicts issued by military courts; instead, verdicts are subject to a review by other military judges and confirmation by the
President, who in practice usually delegates the review function
to a senior military officer. Defense attorneys have complained
that they have not been given sufficient time to prepare defenses
and that judges tend to rush cases involving a large number of
defendants.
The State Security Emergency courts share jurisdiction with
military courts over crimes affecting national security ....

Sen-

tences are subject to confirmation by the President but may not
be appealed."
In addition, the 1999 Country Report on Nigeria addressed denials
of rights to fair trial in prior military tribunals that sometimes used a
presumption of guilt. "In most cases ... the accused had the right to

legal counsel, bail, and appeal,"
but "decisions of the tribunals were ex24
empt from judicial review."

21. General Comment No. 13, U.N. GOAR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 21st Sess., U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/I/REV. 1, art. 14, para. 4 (1994). See also sources cited infra note 26.
22. U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 1999, 106th
Cong. (Joint Comm. Print 2000), at 905.
23. Id. at 2037-38.
24. Id. at 388.
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At a minimum, U.S. military commissions must now comply with
Rights,2 1
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
which sets forth a minimum set of customary and treaty-based human
rights to due process guaranteed to all persons in all circumstances by
customary international law, 26 the International Covenant, 27 and thus also
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 176 [hereinafter International Covenant or ICCPRI. In times of armed conflict or occupation, rights under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol I will also be applicable. See,
e.g., text and sources cited supra note 12; text and sources cited infra notes 31-32, 34-36,
39.
26. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Duko Tadi6, 35 I.L.M. 32, $T 45-48 (Int'l Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l Hum. Law Committed in
the Territory of Former Yugoslavia 1995) (Decision on the Defence Motion lor Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction); The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework
of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Oct. I, 1999,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 16 (1999) reviewed in William J.Aceves, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law,
94 AM. J.INT'L L. 555, 559 (2000); Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph
2 of SecuriA, Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704, I 106, 116 (also noting that "the
right of appeal ...is a fundamental element of individual civil and political rights ..?'),
Annex, arts. 20-22, 25 (1993); Jordan J.Paust et al., Report of the ICJ Mission of Inquiry
into the IsraeliMilitary Court Systei in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza, reprinted in 14
HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 10, passim (1990); Michafil Wladimiroff, Rights of Suspects
and Accused, in I SUBSTANTiVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw 420, 430-31 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000) [hereinafter SUBSTANTIVE ANt) PROCEDURAL ASPECTS]. See also U.N. GOAR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
General Comment No. 29, at para. 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add. 1 (2001)
(As certain elements of the right to a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law during armed conflict, the Committee finds no
justification for derogation from these guarantees during other emergency situations. The Committee is of the opinion that the principles of legality and the rule
of law require that fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected during
a state of emergency. Only a court of law may try and convict a person for a criminal offence.).
Id.
The Human Rights Committee also noted that "a general reservation to the right to a fair
trial would not be" permissible because of the customary, nonderogable, and peremptory
characterjus cogens of the human right to a fair trial. U.N. GOAR, Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6, at para. 8 (1994). Customary
international law also requires that there be no "denial of justice" to aliens, such as "denial of
access to courts, or denial of procedural fairness and due process in relation to judicial proceedings ....RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 7 11, cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATrEMENT]. The reporters' note to the Restatement also
lists among customary violations: denials of due process in criminal proceedings, an unfair
trial, a tribunal manipulated by the executive, denial of the right to defend oneself and to
confront witnesses, conviction without diligent and competent counsel, and denial of an
interpreter. Id. § 711, reporters' note 2. The recent A.B.A. resolution also recommended
"compliance with Articles 14 and 15" of the ICCPR. See A.B.A. res., supra note 17. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions incorporates such customary guarantees by
reference and they are nonderogable under Geneva law. See supra notes 12, 15.
27. International Covenant, supra note 25. When it ratified the International Covenant,
the United States placed a declaration in its instrument of ratification that attempted to func-
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by and through Articles 55(c) and 56 of the United Nations Charter.
These rights include the general right of all persons "in full equality" to
"a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law," although the press and public can be excluded for reasons, for example, of "public order (ordre public) or

national security in a democratic society;
3

innocent until proved guilty;

29

the right to be presumed

the right to be informed "promptly and in

tion as a declaration of partial (not full or general) non-self-execution. The declaration had a
very limited purpose. The intent was merely to clarify that the treaty itself "will not create a
private cause of action in U.S. courts." Further, the declaration expressly did not apply to
Article 50 of the International Covenant, which requires that all of the provisions of the
treaty apply without any limitation or exceptions. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.S. Senate Executive Report 102-23 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992). See INT'L
LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 10, at 190. Thus, the declaration does not limit the reach of
Article 50 or use of the due process and equal protection provisions defensively in a criminal
proceeding. See, e.g., INT'L LAW AND LiritGATiON, supra note 10, at 75-76; ASIIJCCIL Joint
Panel on the Conduct of International Relations in Federal States, 85 PROC., AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. 132, 141 (1991) (Ruth Wedgwood, remarks); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208
F.3d 1282, 1284 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (noting that despite the declaration, the ICCPR is part of
the supreme law of the land) aff'g 132 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding
the prohibition against private causes of action does not apply when raising "ICCPR claims
defensively"). Additionally, the declaration is not relevant to the reach of customary human
rights to due process (now reflected in Article 14 of the ICCPR), customary prohibitions of
"denial ofjustice" to aliens, or customary human rights norms jus cogens.
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c), 56. Concerning the guarantee of customary human rights
to all persons by and through the U.N. Charter, see, for example, Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630
F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980). The legal duty of States under the Charter to promote respect
for and to observe human rights, like customary international law, is "universal" in its reach.
See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, arts. 55(c), 56; International Covenant, supra note 25, pmbl.
29. International Covenant, supra note 25, art. 14, T 1. See text supra notes 20, 22;
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("In the name of security the police state justifies its arbitrary oppressions on evidence
that is secret .... ); Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1989). But see GPW,
supra note 12, art. 105 ("exceptionally ... held in camiera in the interest of State security");
GC, supra note 15, art. 74 ("as an exceptional measure, to be held in camera"). If full trials
cannot be held in secret under the International Covenant and GPW, national security interests can nonetheless be accommodated through use of in camera inspection of materials and
the closing of portions of proceedings to the general public. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 12, arts. 68(2) ("to protect victims and witnesses or an
accused, [the court may] conduct any part of the proceedings in camera"), 72 (regarding
protection of national security information). Section 4(c)(4) of the Military Order directs the
Secretary of Defense to devise rules of procedure that protect certain classified information
from unauthorized disclosure. Military Order, supra note I, § 4(c)(4).
30. International Covenant, supra note 25, art. 14, T 2. Human rights and law of war
treaties typically do not mention the standard of proof applicable to a suspect's guilt, but the
trend evident in rules of procedure and evidence in the newer international criminal tribunals,
reflecting current and widespread opinio juris concerning human rights to due process, is to
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, supra note 12, art. 66(3) ("the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt"); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rule 87(A), U.N. Doc. IT/32/REV. 13 (1998), in
Basic Documents, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
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detail in a language [the accused] understands of the nature and cause of
the charge against him;" the right "[t]o have adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of
his own choosing;"' the right "[t]o be tried without undue delay;" the
right "[t]o be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his choosing;" the right "[tlo examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf; ' 2 the right "[t]o have the
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 119 (1998) [hereinafter ICTY Rules] ("A finding of guilt may
be reached only when a majority of the Trial Chamber is satisfied that guilt has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."); U.N. Rules, supra note 13, Rule 32.
31. International Covenant, supra note 25, art. 14, '$1
3(a)-(b). Concerning access to
counsel and adequate time and facilities for preparation, see Report of the Mission, supra
note 26, at 37-42; GPW, supra note 12, arts. 104-105; GC, supra note 15, art. 72; sources
cited supra notes 13, 20, 22. See also GC, supra note 15, arts. 3(1)(d), 5, 71 (three weeks
notice before trial), 76 ("right to be visited"), 146 ("In all circumstances, the accused persons
shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less favourable
than those provided by Articles 105" and following of GPW.); GPW, supra note 12, arts.
3(l)(d), 102, 129; Geneva Protocol 1, supra note 12, art. 75(4)(a); U.N. Rules, supra note 13,
Rules 25-27; IV PicTET, supra note 15, at 356-57, 595-96 (GC art. 146 guarantees are too
numerous to list but include those mirrored in GPW arts. 87, 99, 101, 103, 105-106); SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL AsPECTS, supra note 26, at 439-41, 531; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 26, § 711 reporters' note 4. The November 13th Military Order does not state that accused have a right to counsel of their choice. See Military Order, supra note 1, § 4(c)(5).
However, it must be interpreted consistently with international law. See text and sources cited
supra note 10; text and sources cited infra note 81.
Once a detainee is reasonably accused of a crime, the detainee should be provided notice
of the right to counsel and foreign accused should be notified of the right to communicate
with their government. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
(1963). Concerning notification under the Vienna Convention, see INT'L LAW AND LITIGA"rtON, supra note 10, at 394-96; Frederic L. Kirgis, Restitution as a Remedy in U.S. Courts
for Violations of International Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (2001). No logical reason exists
why U.S. nationals should be informed of their rights without delay but foreign nationals
should not.
32. International Covenant, supra note 25, art. 14, 1 3(c)-(e). See also sources cited
supra notes 20, 26; GPW, supra note 12, art. 105; GC, supra note 15, arts. 3(l)(d), 72;
Geneva Protocol 1, supra note 12, art. 75(4)(g). Unlike U.S. practice, this does not include
full cross-examination and does not seem to preclude every use of hearsay evidence. See,
e.g., SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL AsPECTS, supra note 26, at 448-49, 473-74, 460-62,
532-35, 556-57, 569-70, 580; PAUST Er AL., supra note 12, at 648-49; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, supra note 12, arts. 67-69, 72-73; Major Marsha V. Mills, War
Crimes in the 21st Century, 3 HO:STRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 47, 55-56 (1999) (also addressing
ICTY and ICTR decisions regarding permissible hearsay evidence); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 26, § 71 1 reporters' note 2; LJ: sources cited supra note 20. The November 13th Military
Order directs that orders and regulations prepared by the Secretary of Defense "shall ...
provide for ... admission of ... evidence" of "probative value to a reasonable person."
Military Order, supra note I, § 4(c)(3). However, the 1970 DOD study focused on Article 36
of the U.C.M.J. 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000). The study noted that Congress has directed the
President to follow rules of evidence, as far as practicable, that conform with those
applicable in federal district courts. It concluded that "it would be difficult to argue that
hearsay or other arguably probative but objectionable evidence would [be] permissible by
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free assistance of an interpreter;" the right "[n]ot to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt;" and the right to have "his
conviction and sentence ... reviewed by a higher tribunal according to
law."33 Section 4(c)(8) of President Bush's November 13t" Military Order
requiring that orders and regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense
shall provide for "submission of the record of the trial ... for review
and final decision" by the President or Secretary of Defense clearly
vio14
lates the venerable human right to an appeal in a higher tribunal. Also,
'practicality'" and, further, "the right to confront witnesses is clearly fundamental to a fair
trial." See 1970 DOD Study, supra note 9, tab K. See also sources cited infra note 51.
Additionally, prisoners of war must have at least the same due process rights that U.S.
military personnel would have. See GPW, supra note 12, art. 102; III PICTET, supra note 12,
at 623. See also GC, supra note 15, art. 146; IV PICTET, supra note 15, at 595-96 ("the same
system" is required for civilians and others protected by the Convention who are prosecuted
for war crimes); Geneva Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 75(1); sources cited infra note 39.
Further, human rights law requires equal protection for all accused. See sources cited infra
notes 37-38. Prisoners of war are also specifically entitled to "the documents which are
generally communicated to the accused by virtue of the laws in force in the armed forces of
the" United States. See GPW, supra note 12, art. 105.
33. International Covenant, supra note 25, art. 14, 1 3(f)-(g), 5.
34. See id. § 7(b)(2)(i). Concerning related denials of appeal see also infra text accompanying notes 57-61. With respect to prisoners of war, the November 13th Military Order
would also violate the Geneva Conventions. See GPW, supra note 12, arts. 106 ("Every prisoner of war shall have, in the same manner as the members of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power, the right of appeal or petition from any sentence pronounced upon him,
with a view to the quashing or revising of the sentence or the reopening of the trial."), 129.
With respect to foreign civilians held during an international armed conflict or occupation
and "unlawful combatants" who do not have prisoner of war status, the November 13th Order would violate GC Articles 73 and 146. See GC supra note 15, arts. 73, 146. See also GC,
supra note 15, arts. 3(l)(d), 5 para. 3 , 78, 147; IV PICTET, supra note 15, at 369 ("appeals
either to a 'court' or a 'board'. That means that the decision will never be left to one individual."); Geneva Protocol 1, supra note 12, art. 75(4)(j). The European Court of Human Rights
has ruled that British military tribunal use of appointment of members and review by the
convening authority violates the suspects' rights to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal and to an appeal by a tribunal reflected in Article 6 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, 213
U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 22, 1984, art. 2(1). See, e.g., Findlay v. United Kingdom, 30
Eur. Ct. H.R. 263 (1997). See also R. v. G6n6reux, [1992] S.C.R. 259 (Canadian military
tribunals lacked independence and impartiality in violation of the Canadian Charter); RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 711 and reporters' note 2 ("tribunal manipulated by the
executive" results in a "denial of justice"); Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 26
(human right to appeal is fundamental); Bucherer supra note 20; Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 60/91,
ACHPRIRPT/8th/Rev. 1, Annex VI, at 4 (1994-95), reproduced in part in FRANcisco FOREST
MARTIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW & PRACTICE 607-08 (1997); U.S.
Dep't of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 1999, supra notes 22-24, at
379, 1292, 2031. Concerning appellate review of U.S. courts-martial decisions, see, for example, 10 U.S.C. §§ 866-867(a), 869 (2000). As the above demonstrate, presidential review
in place of an appellate tribunal would also violate the customary human right to independent and impartial justice. The recent A.B.A. resolution also recommended "certiorari review
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under Article 7 of the International Covenant and customary human
rights law, torture and cruel or inhumane treatment of any detained person clearly would be illegal). Politically at least, other common rules of
evidence adopted by the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda should form part of the minimum set of due
process guarantees under rules of procedure and evidence of any military commission that the United States creates. Additionally, foreign
states cannot lawfully extradite accused to the United States when there
is a real risk that their human rights and/or protections under the Geneva

Conventions will be violated.

Similarly, other states cannot lawfully

by the U.S. Supreme Court (in addition to the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus)."
See A.B.A. res., supra note 17.
35. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845-46 (1tth Cir. 1996); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 E3d 232, 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Filartiga
v. Pena-irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-84 (2d Cir. 1980); Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios,
157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1360-61 (S.D.Fla. 2001); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 18487 (D. Mass. 1995). See also INt'L LAW ANt) LiTcATON, supra note 10, at 274-342. Such
conduct would also be illegal under the Geneva Conventions regardless of the status of accused (e.g., as a prisoner of war or civilian, terrorist or terrorist supporter); GPW, supra note
12, arts. 3, 13-14, 87, 99, 130; GC, supra note 15, arts. 3, 27, 31-33, 147; Geneva Protocol I,
supra note 12, arts. 75(l) and (2), 85(3). Section 3(b) of the Military Order rightly requires
that persons subject to the order "shall be ...treated humanely .... Military Order, supra
note I, § 3(b). Additionally, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, states that
"[evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or internationally recognized
human rights shall not be admissible if: (a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or (b) The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and
would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings." Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, supra note 12, art. 69(7). See also Case 11.0006, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 71,
OEA/Ser.L/V/ll.88, doc. 9 rev. (1995) (exclusionary rule applies to material seized during
search in violation of due process and other rights), reproduced in part in MARrtiN, ET AL.,
supra note 31, at 644-46; Kirgis, supra note 3 I, at 346-48.
36. See. e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1832 (1996); Soering v.
United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ci. H.R., Ser. A (1989). See also U.N. CHARTER arts. 55(c), 56
(duty to take action to achieve universal respect for and observance of human rights); GPW,
supra note 12, art. 12 (transferee must be willing and able to comply with the Convention);
GC, supra note 15, art. I (it is the duty of all signatories "to respect and to ensure respect for
the present Convention in all circumstances."); Geneva Protocol 1,supra note 12, art. 88(2)(3); IV Ptclrtctr, supra note 15, at 16. Spain has already indicated that itwill not extradite
eight persons suspected of complicity in the September I Ith attack unless the United States
agrees that they will not be tried in a military commission. See, e.g., Sam Dillon & Donald G.
McNeil, Jr., Spain Sets Hurdle for Extraditions: Tells
U.S. That Terror Suspects Must Receive
Civilian Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24. 2001, at At (adding that "a senior European Union
official ...doubted that any of the 15 [EUI nations ...would agree to extradition that involved the possibility of a military trial."). Shanker and Seelye, supra note 15, ("Britain and
France warned they might not turn over Taliban and At Qaeda fighters captured by their
troops in Afghanistan unless Mr. Bush" pledges to honor the Geneva Conventions.). Further,
an occupying power cannot transfer a person protected Linder the Geneva Civilian Convention out of occupied territory. See, e.g.,
GC, supra note 15, arts. 49, 66, 76, 147; Geneva
Protocol 1, supra note 12, art. 85(4)(a); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
supra note 12, art. 8(2)(a)(vii) and (b)(viii).
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tolerate violations of human rights and laws of war by U.S. military
commissions operating within their territories.
An additional human rights violation is built into the present Military Order. Section 2(a) limits applicability of the Order to "any
individual who is not a Untied States citizen." Thus, the enforcement of
U.S. and/or international laws through military commissions will un-

avoidably involve national or social origin discrimination" and a denial
of equal protection of the law" in violation of customary and treatybased human rights law, as well as various provisions of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I. Further, any new rules of procedure that
37. On the prohibition of national or social origin discrimination, see, for example, International Covenant, supra note 25, arts. 2, 26; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
arts. 2, 7, U.N. G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); Advisory
Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57, para. 131 ("To establish ... , and to enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, and limitations exclusively based on grounds of ... national ... origin
which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the ...
[U.N.] Charter."). The same human rights provisions prohibit discrimination on the basis of
"status," which should cover, for example, discrimination on the basis of military or nonmilitary status. On the nature of the Universal Declaration as customary international law and as
an authoritative aid for interpretation of human rights protected by and through the U.N.
Charter, see, for example, MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 272-74, 302, 325-30 (1980); INT'L LAW AS LAW OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 181,
191, 198-200, 228 n.182, 246 n.372, 256 n.468, 286 n.595, 436 n.48; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 t. Supp. 787, 796-97 (D.
Kan. 1980).
38. On the prohibition of a denial of equal protection of the law, especially concerning
enforcement in courts or tribunals, see, for example, International Covenant, supra note 25,
arts. 14(1) ("All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals.") and (3) ("everyone
shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality"), 26 ("All persons are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of
the law."); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 37, arts. 2, 7. Additionally,
bilateral friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties often require access to courts and
equality of treatment. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 713(2) and cmt. h, reporters'
note 3; Wilson, Access-to-Courts Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 47 Am. J.
INT'L L. 20 (1953); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1924); Provisional
Agreement in Regard to Diplomatic and Consular Representation, Juridical Protection,
Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 7, 1933, U.S.-Saudi Arabia, art. II, 1933 U.S.T. Lexis 55
(nationals of one country in the "territories and possessions" of the other country "shall enjoy the fullest protection of the laws and authorities of the country, and they shall not be
treated ... in any manner less favorable than the nationals of any other foreign country.").
39. Prisoners of war "can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced
by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power ....
GPW, supra note 12, art. 102. See also id. arts. 106, 129,
130; GC, supra note 15, arts. 3(l)(d), 146; Geneva Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 75(1) (no
adverse discrimination is allowed and courts must be "regularly constituted" and utilize
"regular judicial procedures"); IV PiCTET, supra note 15, at 595-96 (GC requires provision
of "the same system to all accused whatever their personal status" and GC art. 146
guarantees for civilians and others protected by the Convention who are prosecuted for war
crimes are too numerous to list but include those mirrored in GPW arts. 87, 99, 101, 103,
105-106); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 12, art. 8(2)(b)(xiv);
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allow hearsay and other evidence that would be inadmissible in federal
district courts or courts-martial, allow conviction or sentencing by a
percentage of a panel that is less than that required in federal district
courts or courts-martial, create an appellate process that is not the same
as that available to U.S. nationals, and/or deny habeas corpus to foreign
nationals prosecuted abroad would violate equal protection guarantees.
In addition, no rational and lawful reason exists why U.S. military tribunals must follow certain procedures during trials of U.S. nationals but
cannot follow the same procedures during trials of foreign accused, especially when several foreign nationals have already been indicted,
convicted, or are being prosecuted in federal district courts. Claims that
some foreign accused should be relegated to military commissions with
less due process protections because application of the same rules of
procedure and evidence mirrored in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure might not facilitate conviction are facially unacceptable.
There are also important constitutional issues involving due process,
especially in view of the rationale in Reid v. Covert concerning the
lawful power or authority of the government of the United States (deLAW OF WAR WORKSHOP DiESKBOOK 209 (Brian J. Bill, ed., 2000), available at
www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETlnternet/Homepages/ACTJAGSAWeb.nsf/8f7edfd448e0ec6c8
525694bOO64ba51/9dcO2ec45aba401d852569adOO7c79df/$FILElChapter%208.pdf ("[Treaty
obligations provide a floor of procedural rights, at least as to offenses by prisoners of war, which
preclude military commissions in this category of cases."). The International Committee of the
Red Cross Commentary warns:
The court proceedings should be carried out in a uniform manner, whatever the nationality of the accused. Nationals, friends, enemies, all should be subject to the
same rules of procedure and judged by the same courts. There is therefore no
question of setting up special tribunals to try war criminals of enemy nationality.
III PICTET, supra note 12, at 623. See also id. at 476; IV PICTEr, supra note 15, at 595-96.
Professor Wedgwood missed these points, as well as those noted supra notes 37-38. See
Wedgwood, supra note 15. So did the A.B.A. See A.B.A. res., supra note 17 (recommending
that the military commissions not be applicable to U.S. citizens, lawful resident aliens and
other persons lawfully present in the United States).
With respect to the death penalty, U.S. military prosecuted in general courts-martial can
receive the death penalty only by unanimous verdict, but the Military Order states that rules
concerning conviction and sentencing "shall at a minimum provide for" conviction and sentencing "only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the commission present
at the time of the vote, a majority being present." Military Order, supra note I, § 4(c)(6)-(7)
(emphasis added). GPW Article 102 requires conviction and sentencing of prisoners of war
in at least the same manner as conviction and sentencing of U.S. military. See GPW supra
note 8, art. 102. The same requirement pertains with respect to civilians and others protected
by the Geneva Conventions. Additionally, all persons are entitled to equal protection under
customary human rights law (see text and sources cited supra note 38) and must therefore
benefit from at least the same rules concerning conviction and sentencing that pertain in
federal district courts. Yet, absent such equal protection guarantees, international law would
not require unanimous verdicts. See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
supra note 12, art. 74(3) and (5); ICTY Rules, supra note 30, Rules 87(A), 88(C).
40. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957).
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spite cases like Eisentrager4 1).42 The Reid rationale is consistent with the
fundamental myth system adopted since the Founders that ours is a

government of delegated powers and one that is entirely a creature of
the Constitution and has no power or authority to act here or abroad
inconsistently with the Constitution.43 Under this approach, the major

question is not whether aliens abroad in time of war have rights, but
whether our government has any power or delegated authority to act
inconsistently with the Constitution." Additionally, the rationale in
41. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (involving the limiting circumstance of
arrest and prosecution in China of war-time enemy belligerents for war crimes committed
"by engaging in, permitting or ordering military activity against the U.S. after surrender of
Germany and before surrender of Japan"). Eisentrager occurred prior to Reid and did not use
the lawful powers approach which was identified in the Reid rationale. See id. Eisentrager
also occurred prior to many major developments in human rights law regarding due process.
Nonetheless, it held by merely a 6-3 vote that enemy alien belligerents "engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United States" charged and prosecuted in a
foreign country for war crimes have no constitutional "right of security or an immunity from
military trial and punishment" and could not seek relief by habeas corpus. Id. at 771, 781,
785. Concerning the limited reach and suspect precedential authority of Eisentrager, see also
United States v. bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181-83 & n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United
States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 916 & n.13 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd on other gds., 859 F.2d
953 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Jordan J. Paust, An Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and
the Law, 19 CONN. L. REV. 697, 726-34 (1987); text infra notes 63-67. But see Paul B.
Stephan I1l, Constitutional Limits on the Struggle Against International Terrorism: Revisiting
the Rights of Overseas Aliens, 19 CONN. L. REV. 831, 834-45 (1987). There are also serious
questions whether bin Laden and his followers were enemy alien belligerents or committed
war crimes on September 1Ith. See text and sources cited supra note 16.
42. See United States vc Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 915, 917; United States v. Tiede, 86
F.R.D. 227 (1979); HERBERT STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN (1984).
43. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 5-6, 12, 35 n.62. See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668 n.5 (1974), quoting Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 382
(1st Cir. 1953) ("there cannot exist under the American flag any governmental authority
untrammeled by the requirements of due process of law as guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States."); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)
(President's power "must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."); id. at 646, 649-50 (Jackson, J., concurring) (the President's power to execute law
"must be matched against words of the Fifth Amendment" and the Founders omitted "powers
ex necessitate to meet an emergency"); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 25 (1942) ("Congress
and the President ... possess no power not derived from the Constitution."); Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922) ("The Constitution of the United States is in force ...
wherever and whenever the sovereign power of that government is exerted:" ); United States
v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 200 (1882); United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 384, 393-94
(C.C. Pa. 1798) ("government can never assume any power, that is not expressly granted by
that instrument, nor exercise a power in any other manner that is there prescribed"); INT'L
LAW AS LAW OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 329, 333-34, 469-78, passim.
44. See Paust, supra note 41, at 722-34; Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-23,
127, 131 (1866) (recognizing that the Executive has no powers outside the Constitution or ex
necessitate, that the Constitution "covers within the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances," and, importantly, that trials must occur in
federal district courts when such courts are reasonably available.). With respect to human
rights, Milligan also affirmed: "By the protection of the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers ....
Id. at 119.
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Verdugo-Urquidez,45 noting language in the Fourth Amendment that
differs from words in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (which can apply to aliens),46 could form an additional basis for Supreme Court
recognition consistent with that of many lower federal courts that
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights apply to aliens abroad.47 Several
courts have also recognized that international law can inform the
meaning of "due process" protected by the Fifth Amendment here and
abroad. 41 Yet, what process is constitutionally due abroad, viewed contextually and as informed by international law, might not be the same
as that required in a federal district court. 49

45. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
46. See id. at 265-66 (noting that the phrase "the people" in the Fourth Amendment
refers to a class of people with a "sufficient connection with this country" in contrast with
'person" and "accused" used in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). Cf id. at 269 (discussing
Eisentrager holding); INt'L LAW ANt) LrrtcATON, supra note 10, at 209-10. Reid also
recognized that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments "are ... all inclusive with their sweeping
references to 'no person' and to 'all criminal prosecutions.' " Reid 1e Covert, 354 U.S. at 8
(1957). The Fourteenth Amendment also provides equal protection guarantees to "any
person" and such guarantees have been applied to the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215 (1995).
47. See. e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. I, 26-27 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at
79-81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 371-72 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276-80 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Yunis, 681 F Supp. 909, 911, 916-18 & nn.13-14 (D.D.C. 1988); United States v. Tiede, 86
F.R.D. 227, 259 (1979) (also recognizing the reach of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to any
"person" or "accused"). See also Dostal v. Haig, 652 F.2d 173, 176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("We accept, arguendo, IJudge Stern's] attractive position that the Bill of Rights is fully
applicable to govern the conduct ... in Berlin ....
); Turney v. United States, 115 F Supp.
457 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (Fifth Amendment applies abroad regarding taking of alien property). Cf
Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602-04 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (distinguishing, among others,
cases applying the Fifth Amendment to conduct in "territories controlled by the U.S." or to
conduct in foreign territory when an accused is later subject to "trial in a United States
court."). There was no consideration of relevant international law or its use as an interpretive
aid. Id. at 603-04.
48. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 26-28 (Murphy, J., dissenting); United States
v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d at 372; United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047 (1991); INT'L LAW AS LAW OF THE U.S., supra note 5, at 192,
196, 248 n.392 (citing several Supreme Court and other courts' decisions addressing human
rights and due process under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments), 254-55 n.459 (same). In
1814, Justice Story, in his dissent, affirmed the unswerving expectation that the President
"cannot lawfully transcend the rules of warfare established among civilized nations. He cannot lawfully exercise powers or authorize proceedings which the civilized world repudiates
and disclaims." Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 153 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting). Verdugo-Urquidez also recognized that restrictions on government conduct can be
imposed by treaty despite inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment to aliens abroad. See 494
U.S. 259, 275 (1990).
49. See text and sources cited supra notes 29, 32. Whether or not the Fifth Amendment
applies abroad in a certain way, due process and equal protection requirements under international human rights law, other treaties, and laws of war will still apply. See also text and
sources cited supra notes 10, 37-39; text infra notes 72-75.
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In view of Milligan,"' it appears that removal of certain accused

from the United States, where Article III district courts are clearly
available, to a military commission in Afghanistan or some other foreign territory would be constitutionally impermissible. Mr. bin Laden

and several of his entourage, including Mr. Moussaoui, have already
been indicted in a federal district court, and some have been convicted." Besides being unconstitutional under Milligan when Article
III courts are available, Sections 2(b) ("is tried only in accordance
with Section 4"), 4(a) ("shall ... be tried by military commission"),
and 7(b)(1) ("military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction") of
the Military Order needlessly attempt to limit U.S. prosecutorial options.
Another specific question is whether the President, without approval by Congress, has the power to suspend habeas corpus, as he
attempts to do under Section 7(b)(2)(i) of the November 13th Military
Order. 2 Although President Lincoln did so during the Civil War, such
50. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See text and sources cited supra note
44; see also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 326 (1946) ("Only when a foreign invasion or civil war actually closes the courts and renders it impossible for them to administer
criminal justice can martial law validly be involved to suspend their functions."); United
States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (1970) (noting "words 'in time of war' mean, for the
purposes of Article 2 (10) [of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 802 (10)] .... a war formally declared by Congress;" the Vietnam War was not such a war, and military courts therefore do
not have jurisdiction over civilians). Cf Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1942) (noting
that federal courts were open). Ex parte Quirin distinguished Milligan by noting that the case
at hand involved offenses against the laws of war committed by enemy belligerents whereas
Milligan involved an accused who was not an enemy belligerent and was not subject to the
law of war. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46. There are serious questions whether bin
Laden and his followers were enemy belligerents or committed war crimes on September
11 th. See text and sources cited supra note 16.
51. See United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp.2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v.
Moussaoui, indictment (E.D. Va. Dec. 10, 2001), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/pdf/
moussaoui.pdf (last visited, Feb. 27, 2002); United States v. Reid, indictment (D. Mass.
2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/reidindictment.pdf (last visited, Feb. 27, 2002). Trial of
Moussaoui in a federal district court was approved by President Bush. See, e.g., Don Van
Natta, A Nation Challenged: The Legal Venue; Compromise Settles Debate Over Tribunal,
N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B 1. Successful prosecution of some of the accused also demonstrates that trial in a federal district court with rules of procedure and evidence utilized
therein is "practicable" within the meaning of 10 U.S.C. § 836. See 10 U.S.C. § 836.
52. The language in the Order is extremely broad and clearly attempts to deny habeas
corpus: "the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the
individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States...." Military Order, supra note I,
§ 7(b)(2). See also N.Y. City Bar Report, supra note 3, at 2. Professor Peter Raven-Hansen
agrees and noted that the word "privilege" appears rarely in the U.S. Constitution and is used
uniquely in connection with the suspension of habeas corpus provision found in Article I,
Section 9, concerning congressional power. Workshop for Federal District Judges II, Federal
Judicial Center, Dec. 4, 2001, San Diego (oral remarks during a panel session at which the
author also participated). Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales was in extreme error
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action is constitutionally suspect, especially since suspension is ad-

dressed in Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution in connection with
congressional powers, and Congress actually ratified Lincoln's action

in 1863.53 Further, habeas corpus or certiorari review was available to
accused in Ex parte Quirin and In re Yamashita, and such review has
4
been expanded in cases like Calley v. Callaway.1
Additionally, the

Court in Ex parte Quirin recognized that military commission decisions can be "set aside by the courts" when there is "clear conviction
that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted," 55 and affirmed that "the duty ... rests on the
courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty.' 5 6 Like the Bush

Military Order, President Roosevelt's 1942 Proclamation concerning
persons subject to trial by military commission attempted to deny "all
such persons ...access to the courts. 5 7 The Executive argued that if
when he wrote: "The order preserves judicial review in civilian courts. Under the order, anyone arrested ...will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction
through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court." Gonzales, supra note 3. This is the
same person who, as General Counsel to Governor George Bush and in response to a letter
from the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State in 1997 inquiring about
implementation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (a treaty ratified by the
United States), wrote: "Since the State of Texas is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention
...
., we believe it is inappropriate to ask Texas to determine whether a breach" occurred.
Letter of June 16, 1997, quoted in part in INT'L LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 10, at 39091. But see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
53. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 631 n.I (Douglas, J.
concurring), citing Exparte Merryman, 17 F Cas. 144 (C.C. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (noting
the President alone has no power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus); JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 342 (1883); N.Y. City Bar Report, supra note 3, at 3
("the power to suspend habeas corpus is vested by Constitution only with the Congress"),
21-22 & n.61, 25. Moreover, congressional participation seems critical for an adequate
check and balance of powers, especially when suspension of the writ can preclude even the
limited judicial role in the check and balance process available through habeas corpus review.
54. Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 194-202 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
911 (1975) (noting inquiry into errors of "substantial constitutional dimension" such as those
"so fundamental as to have resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice" is also permitted).
Since international law is supreme federal law with constitutional bases and moorings (see
text and sources cited infra note 75), it would appear to be appropriate under even habeas
review to address violations of international law that have such a substantial dimension or
that would result in a gross miscarriage of justice.
55. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
56. Id. at 19. See also Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 102-03 (1868) (regarding
review of the trial of a civilian by a military commission, the Court "in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, may, by the writ of habeas corpus, aided by the writ of certiorari,
revise" lower military or judicial decisions).
57. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23; Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2,
1942) (containing nearly the same language found in Section 7(b)(2)(i) of the Bush Military
Order).
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the President's 1942 Proclamation "has force, no court may afford the
petitioners a hearing."58 Importantly, the Supreme Court emphatically
denied that such a power is held by the President:
neither the Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy
aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners'
contentions that the Constitution and laws of the United States
constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission.' 9
Similarly, in In re Yamashita the Court affirmed that generally the Executive "could not ... withdraw from the courts the duty and power to
make such inquiry into the authority of the commission as may be made
by habeas corpus." 6 Justice Murphy also noted in dissent that all of the
Justices had agreed that an Executive assertion that military trials of war
criminals are "completely outside the arena of judicial review, has been
rejected fully and unquestionably," that "the writ of habeas corpus is
available," and that its "ultimate nature and scope ... are within the discretion of the judiciary unless validly circumscribed by Congress" ' 6' Thus,
the attempt in Section 7(b)(2)(i) of the November 13th Military Order to
preclude "any remedy or ... proceeding ... in any court of the United
States"' 62 has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Exparte Quirin and
In re Yamashita.
The only limitation approved by the Court appears in a 6-3 decision
in Eisentrager, where the majority concluded that enemy alien
belligerents "engaged in hostile service of a government at war with the
United States" captured, charged and prosecuted in China for war crimes
63
committed in China have no right to seek relief by habeas corpus. As
noted by Justice Black in dissent, the majority "expressly disavows
conflict with the Quirin and Yamashita decisions" and relied solely "on
the fact that they were captured, tried and imprisoned outside our
territory."'' The majority had distinguished Yamashita because the capture
and trial of General Yamashita in the Philippines had occurred in "insular
possessions" subject to "our sovereignty" and the "offenses were
58. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
59. Id. See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 794 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting)
("The contention that enemy alien belligerents have no standing whatever to contest conviction for war crimes by habeas corpus proceedings has twice been emphatically rejected by a
unanimous Court."); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866) (noting the military
commission could not be justified "on the mandate of the President").
60. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946).
61. Id. at 30 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
62. Military Order, supra note 1, § 7(b)(2)(i).
63. Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 785, 771, 781.
64. Id. at 795 (Black, J., dissenting).
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committed on our territory,'' 61 whereas in Eisentrager the offenses,
capture, and trial had all occurred in China and there was "not ... any
intraterritorial contact.,, 66 These are interesting points of distinction,
especially with respect to September I Ith attacks on our territory and
persons captured or detained in the United States or in territory subject to
U.S. sovereign power, which should include foreign occupied territory
subject to our sovereign power and jurisdiction6 ' and should cover persons
who have been transferred to U.S. warships"' and/or in U.S. military
65. Id. at 780.
66. Id. at 781 ("None of these heads of jurisdiction can be invoked by these petitioners.").
67. See id. at 798 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of habeas corpus "in any land
we govern"); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922); Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244 (1901); Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 17, art. 43 ("The authority of the
legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant .. "); IV PICiTET, supro note 15, at 60 ("occupation" under Geneva law "has a wider meaning than it has in" the
Hague Convention and applies to "troops advancing into" foreign enemy territory, "whether
fighting or not," and "[e]ven a patrol which penetrates into enemy territory without any intention of staying there must respect the Conventions ....
When it withdraws, for example, it
cannot take civilians with it, for that would be contrary to Article 49.... The same thing is
true of raids made into enemy territory or on his coasts."). Cf FM 27-10, supra note 12,
$ 358 (Military occupation "does not transfer the sovereignty [of the occupied state] ... , but
simply the authority or power to exercise some of the rights of sovereignty."). Under the
Geneva standard, the United States seems to have been an occupying power over portions of
Afghan territory prior to any control exercised with the consent of the new Afghan regime.
For example, U.S. military completed the prison camp at Kandahar on December 15, 2001.
See, e.g., Patrick Healy, Fighting Terror: Military Plans: Kandahar: US Readies Prison for
Anticipated Hard-Line Captives, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2001, at A30. The first detainees
arrived there on December 18, 2001. See, e.g., First Prisoners Arrive at US Detention Centre
in Kandahar, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 18, 2001; however, the new interim Afghan
regime did not assume power until December 22, 2001. See, e.g., David Rohde, Afghan
Leader is Sworn In, Asking for Help to Rebuild: Unexpected Appearance of Rival Generals
Adds Air of Unity to Calm Transition, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 2001, at AI; Elizabeth Neuffer,
Diverse Afghan Cabinet Sworn In, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2001, at Al. A U.S. detention
facility had been used earlier at the U.S. marine Camp Rhino. See, e.g., Howard Witt, Bin
Laden Haunts Take Air Pounding, CHICAGo TRIBUNE, Dec. 10, 2001, at 1. Clearly, the United
States had been in complete control of certain areas and of its own military units.
68. Under international law, U.S. flag vessels (especially warships) are the equivalent of
U.S. territory and provide "territorial jurisdiction" (a phrase addressed in Eisentrager, 339
U.S. at 770). See, e.g., INT'L LAW ANi) LITIGATION, supra note 10, at 404 & n.2, 744-51,
758. U.S. warships are also "territory" over which the United States exercises full sovereign
power, including the exercise of military justice and other enforcement competencies. See
also Neil A. Lewis, Rules on Tribunal Require Unanimity on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
28, 2001, at Al("Holding the trials on ships remains an option .... ). When the United States
is an occupying power, the Geneva Civilian Convention and Protocol I prohibit transfers of
protected persons (including civilians and "unlawful combatants"-see text and sources
cited supra note 15) from the occupied territory and require detention and trial of criminal
accused and the serving of sentences in the occupied territory. See GC, supra note 15, arts.
49, 76; Geneva Protocol 1, supra note 12, art. 85(4)(a); IV Piciricr, supra note 15, at 60. Further, "unlawful ... transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person" is a "grave
breach" of the Convention and Protocol. See GC, supra note 12, art. 147; Geneva Protocol 1,
supra note 12, art. 85(4)(a). See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra
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aircraft6 9 to Guantanamo Bay Cuba,0 but the more significant issue is
whether Eisentragershould survive after Reid's fundamental recognition

that our government, which is entirely a creature of the Constitution,
simply has no lawful authority to act here or abroad inconsistently with
the Constitution.' Moreover, there is nothing in the text or structure of
the Constitution that requires adherence to an Eisentrager form of
deviation. Additionally, newer customary and treaty-based international
human rights law and laws of war, other treaties, and the customary
prohibition of denials of justice provide independent bases for due

process and equal protection guarantees,72 access to courts, 73 and the
note 12, art. 8(2)(a)(vii) and (b)(viii). However, when the United States is not an occupying
power it should be able to capture in foreign territory, and bring to trial in the United States,
persons who are directly responsible for an armed attack or process of attacks against the
United States or its military and other nationals overseas. This is in conformity with Article
51 of the U.N. Charter. When the United States is authorized to use force by the U.N. Security Council or is acting under a lawful exercise of power of a regional organization, then it is
in conformity with Articles 52-53 of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., INT'L CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 12, at 500, 504-05; INT'L LAW AND LiTIGATION, supra note 10, at 494-96. Persons who
are not directly responsible for an armed attack or process of attacks against the United
States or its military and other nationals overseas would have to be extradited, and related
law enforcement activities would have to be engaged in, with the consent of the foreign government. See, e.g., INT'L LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 10, at 460-61, 467-97, 499;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, §§ 432-33. The I.C.J. has ruled that a state exercising selfdefense cannot use such power merely to obtain evidence of prior infractions of the law. The
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 1, 34-35.
69. Like warships, U.S. military aircraft are the equivalent of U.S. territory and both territorial and enforcement jurisdictional competencies exist on board such aircraft, especially
when flying over the high seas. See, e.g., INT'L LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 10, at 404,
414.
70. Guantanamo Bay is territory specially occupied by the United States under military
occupation and a treaty regime providing "complete jurisdiction and control" by the United
States. Jordan J. Paust, Non- Extraterritoriality of "Special Territorial Jurisdiction" of the
United States. Forgotten History and the Errors of Erdos, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 305, 327
(1999) (citation omitted); Haitian Ctr. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2d Cir.
1992); United States v. Rogers, 388 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D. Va. 1975). Cf Cuban Am. Bar
Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating Guantanamo Bay is not
U.S. territory as such). Guantanamo Bay is clearly outside the war zone in Afghanistan and
outside the reach of relevant presidential war powers, especially since the offenses were not
committed at Guantanamo. See, e.g., WINTHROP, supra note 14, at 831, 836. Thus, it is apparent that a military commission cannot be properly constituted at Guantanamo Bay. Even if
one could, federal district courts are available only a few miles away.
71. See text and sources cited supra notes 41-44.
72. See text and sources cited supra notes 12, 15, 20-22, 26, 30-32, 34-35, 37-39. See
also GC, supra note 15, arts. 3(l)(d), 70-73, 147.
73. See, e.g., International Covenant, supra note 25, art. 14; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 37, art. 8; H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 13, supra note 21,
paras. 1-4; U.N. GOAR, Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 15, para. 7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/2I/Rev. I/Add.5 (1994); U.N. GOAR, Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 20,
para. 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.3 (1992); General Comment No. 24, supra note
26, paras. 8, 11-12; INT'L LAW As LAW OF U.S., supra note 10, at 75 n.97, 198-203, 262
n.483, 256-72 nn.468-527, 362, 375-76, passim; Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d
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right to review; international law is part of the supreme law of the
United States with its own constitutional and historic moorings and is
law that must be applied by the judiciary;" and international law can
inform the full meaning of due process and equal protection protected
by and through the Constitution.
Another constitutional issue is whether the President can set up a
military commission outside of occupied territory or an actual war zone
during an armed conflict. It appears that he cannot. In 1865, Attorney
General Speed advised the President:
A military tribunal exists under and according to the Constitution in time of war. Congress may prescribe how all such
tribunals are to be constituted, what shall be their jurisdiction,
and mode of procedure. Should Congress fail to create such tribunals, then, under the Constitution, they must be constituted
according to the laws and usages of civilized warfare. They may
take cognizance of such offences as the laws of war permit ....
In time of peace neither Congress nor the military can create
any military tribunals, except such as are made in pursuance of
that clause of the Constitution which gives to Congress the
power "to make rules for the government of the land and naval
forces."77
From his opinion, it appears that relevant presidential power is tied
to a war circumstance and law of war competencies such as the compe-

tence of an occupying power to set up
75 a military commission to try
individuals who violate the laws of war in accordance with the laws of
71, 82 (Tex. 2000) ("The Covenant not only guarantees foreign citizens equal treatment in
the signatorie's courts, but also guarantees them equal access to these courts."); sources cited
supra notes 22, 26, 38.
74. See text and sources cited supra notes 20-22, 26, 34. The Geneva Conventions require at least the same forms of appellate review, including habeas corpus petitions, that
would be available to U.S. military. See GPW, supra note 12, arts. 102, 106; GC, supra note
15, art. 146.
75. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., arts. 11,
§ 3, Il, § 2, VI, cl.2; INT'L LAW AS LAW OF THE
U.S., supra note 5, passim.
76. See text and sources cited supra note 48.
77. II Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 298 (1865). Clearly Congress can regulate the jurisdiction
and procedure of military commissions, but it must do so consistently with international law,
and the requirements of international law "are of binding force upon the departments and
citizens of the Government, though not defined by any law of Congress. Id. at 299. See, e.g.,
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1952); sources cited supra notes 5, 10.
78. See also WINrHROP, supra note II, at 831, 836-67; Halleck, supra note 14; Newton, supra note 14, at 15, 19-21 (stating that jurisdiction apparently exists only over
violations of the laws of war); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 267 (1969) ("courtmartial jurisdiction cannot be extended to reach any person not a member of the Armed
Forces ...no matter how intimate the connection between their offense and the concerns of
military discipline.... [Clourts-martial have no jurisdiction over nonsoldiers, whatever their
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war. Ex parte Quirin involved a military commission set up within the
United States, but it was created during war for prosecution of enemy
belligerents for violations of the laws of war that occurred within the
United States and within the convening authority's field of commandin that case, in the Eastern Defense Command of the United States
Army.7 9
To summarize, President Bush's November 13th Order, far from
providing an "option," denies the United States needed flexibility to
prosecute those covered by the Order who are reasonably accused of
terrorism and other crimes in a federal district court or regional or more
general international fora (especially regarding those accused who are
later found in various countries outside the region of Afghanistan and
with respect to whom the United States seeks extradition); sets up per se
violations of human rights of the accused concerning freedom from national origin discrimination and the rights to equal protection and to an
appeal to a higher tribunal; sets up similar per se violations of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I with respect to prisoners of war,
unprivileged combatants, and civilians protected under the Conventions;
sets up similar violations of various other treaties; creates constitutional
problems concerning due process and the right to habeas corpus; needlessly places some prosecutions at risk; and can bring dishonor to the
United States. Some of the violations relate not merely to due process
guarantees as such, but also to the permissibility of military commission
jurisdiction. For example, since the military commissions cannot provide equal protection in general and equal appellate proceedings as
required by treaty-based and customary international law, use of such
fora would be impermissible.
At a minimum, the Military Order should be amended to allow U.S.
prosecution in alternative fora, to require use of appellate tribunals, to
allow habeas corpus petitions, and to require compliance with other customary human rights of all persons to due process and equal protection
reflected in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and any similar or additional rights reflected in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I concerning prisoners of war, unprivileged
combatants, and civilians. Ad hoc rules of procedure created and
offense."); id. at 302 ("[W]e deal with peacetime offenses, not with authority stemming from
the war power. Civil courts were open. The offenses were committed within our territorial
limits, not in the occupied zone of a foreign country."); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
350 U.S. 11,13-14 & n.4 (1955) (stating ex-service persons are not subject to prosecution in
military courts-martial regarding murder; however, the case did not involve congressional
power to punish offenses against the law of nations).
79. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 22 n.I(1942). Petitioners had also been charged
with war-time espionage, but the Supreme Court merely approved military commission jurisdiction to try violations of the laws of war. Id. at 25.
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changeable by the Secretary of Defense, especially those that are inconsistent with the Military Order, do not provide long-term guarantees of
due process and equal protection. Indeed, today's rules of procedure still
rest on national origin discrimination and deny equal protection in violation of various international laws. Congress should amend Section 821
of Title 10 of the United States Code to reaffirm concurrent jurisdiction
in federal district courts and to assure that any military commission used
in our long-term fight against terrorism will provide at least the due
process and equal protection guarantees required by international law.80
An additional problem is posed for military personnel faced with
implementation of the Military Order. The U.S. military must disobey
an order calling for a patent illegality. Such an order would be ultra vires
and constitute a war crime if issued during an armed conflict.' At least
for military lawyers, the present Military Order, in part, is such an order
and places present and future U.S. military personnel in harms way.
80. An amendment to Section 821 could add the following to the end of the section: "
or in federal district courts. Further, any military tribunal must provide at least the due process and equal protection guarantees required by international law."
81. See, e.g., Captain Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader
Responsibility, 57 MiL. L. REV. 99, 171-75 (1972); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 12, art. 33(l)(c); DOD Law of War Program, Dep't of Defense
Directive 5100.77 (Dec. 9, 1998), available at http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/
d5l007_ 120998/d510077p.pdf. See also FM 27- 10, supra note 12, $ 509(a) (stating order is
not a defense unless one "did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to
know" of the illegality); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1852) (holding
superior's order to do an illegal act can allord no justification for unlawful conduct abroad in
time of war); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) I10, 153 (1814); Little v. Barreme,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (holding presidential orders to military officers in time of
war cannot legalize illegal action abroad); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (stating that the President cannot authorize seizure of a vessel in
violation of a treaty); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No.
16,342) (holding that the President cannot authorize violations of law); Johnson v. TwentyOne Bales, 13 F. Cas. 855, 863 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1814) (No. 7,417) (holding that the court "cannot give ... orders a construction that will lead to .. ." "the executive abrogating" a right
vested by the law and given and recognized in modern warfare); Elgee's Adm'r v. Lovell, 8 F.
Cas. 449, 454 (C.C.D. Mo. 1865) (No. 4,344) (regarding the "law of nations .... no proclamation of the president can change or modify this law .... ); II Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299300 (1865) (stating that the Constitution does not permit Congress or the government to
abrogate the law of nations or to authorize their infraction); sources cited supra note 10.
If they do not disobey such orders, violations of the Geneva Conventions can result in
war crime prosecutions in the United States, other countries, or an international criminal
court exercising universal and/or other bases of jurisdiction. See also FM 27-10, supra note
12, $$ 498-99, 506(b); United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case), 3 TRIAL S OF WAR
CRIMINALs BEFORE rTHE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10, 983-84 (1951); United States v. Uchiyaia, Case No. 35-46 (trial at Yokohama,
Japan, 18 July 1947), addressed in Robert W. Miller, War Crinies Trials it Yokohama, 15
BROOK. L. REv. 191, 207 (1949). Further, the President cannot lawfully order violations of
the laws of war. See, e.g., text and sources cited supra note 10; N.Y. City Bar Report, supra
note 3, at 3 1.
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Current rules of procedure created by the Secretary of Defense pursuant
to the Order contain provisions that are inconsistent with the requirements of the Order, thus creating an issue whether the Order or the ad
hoc procedure is to be followed. Normally, a President's military order
prevails over a Secretary's implementing rules and regulations, although
any gaps or ambiguities in the order must be filled and interpreted consistently with constitutional and international law. However, to the
extent that an Order is inconsistent with constitutional or international
law and is thus ultra vires, the Secretary's rules of procedure that are
consistent with constitutional and international law should prevail.
Finally, since it is apparent that military commissions outside of occupied territory can only prosecute war crimes and it is most likely that
Mr. bin Laden and his entourage did not commit war crimes during the
September 11th attacks on the United States, it is highly probable that a
military commission outside of occupied territory in Afghanistan will
not have jurisdiction to prosecute the initial prime targets of the November 13th Military Order and will have a very limited jurisdiction with
respect to other international terrorists in the future. If alive, Mr. bin
Laden and his entourage should be prosecuted for various other crimes
in federal district courts or in a new international criminal court.
"He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a
precedent that will reach to himself." 2

82. 2

THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE

588 (P Foner ed., 1945).

